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Spatial Interdependence of Local Public Expenditures:
Selected Evidence from the Czech Republic
Lenka ˇ St’astn´ a∗
Abstract Local expenditures in neighbouring municipalities can be spatially interdependent due
to spillovers, cooperation effects, competition effects or mimicking. In this paper, we aim to test
the spatial interdependence of local public expenditures using data on 205 Czech municipalities.
We found positive spatial interdependence in expenditures on housing and culture and nega-
tive spatial interdependence for expenditures on industry and infrastructure and environmental
protection. Additionally, we observed that political characteristics affect the size of spending;
left-wing parties tend to increase expenditures on culture and decrease expenditures on industry
and infrastructure; and higher party fragmentation decreases overall capital expenditures and
expenditures on housing.
Keywords Spillovers, ﬁscal competition, local public ﬁnance
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1. Introduction
Recently, a great deal of attention has been devoted to studying the spatial interdepen-
dence of local public policies. This aspect of the literature has developed within the
scope of ﬁscal federalism, in particular, within the discussion on the decentralization
of ﬁscal policies as a potential source of competition among local governments.
Local policies are interdependent if ﬁscal decisions in neighboring jurisdictions
play an important role in the decision of domestic jurisdiction. Until recently, these
aspects were analyzed only for tax policy and the literature on spatial tax competi-
tion developed (see Hayashi and Boadway 2001; Revelli 2002; Bordignon et al. 2003;
Allers and Elhorst 2005; Bosch and Sol´ e-Oll´ e 2007). Recently, the analysis has been
extended to public expenditures and one of the reasons behind this was the fact that
many local governments do not have large tax competencies.
Fiscal interactions among local governments can be driven by various effects: (i)
positive or negative spillovers affecting residents of other districts; (ii) competition
between regions to attract residents and businesses; (iii) mimicking driven by yardstick
competition and imperfectly informed authorities; and ﬁnally, (iv) cooperation and
coordinationbetweenlocalgovernments. Theseeffectsarediscussedinagreaterextent
in next section.
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If we empirically test the theoretical hypotheses of the potential drivers of ﬁscal
interactions, the common way to proceed is to estimate the ﬁscal reaction function, i.e.
the parameters that indicate whether any particular local government will change an
expenditure level in response to changes in other local governments.
Empirical literature on the spatial interdependence of public expenditures was ini-
tiated by a pioneering study by Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), who estimate an em-
pirical model of strategic interaction in expenditures among state governments in the
United States. Brueckner (2003) provides the overview of empirical studies dealing
with spatial interdependence.
Strategic interaction among local governments is empirically explored in Brueck-
ner (1998). He focuses on the adoption of growth-control measures by municipalities
in California and seeks evidence of policy interdependence. Lundberg (2001) tests
for the effects of recreational and cultural expenditures in Swedish municipalities and
he shows that municipalities with similar expenditure levels are clustered to a greater
extent. Revelli (2006a) explores neighborhood effects in social service provisions and
proves that the source of spatial autocorrelation in social spending is endogenous mim-
icking among neighboring localities.
Sol´ e-Oll´ e (2006) presents a framework for measuring spillovers resulting from lo-
cal expenditure policies and estimates a reaction function with interactions between
local governments using data on Spanish local governments. Borck, Caliendo and
Steiner (2007) study ﬁscal competition between jurisdictions via the size and structure
of public spending. They model the reaction functions of jurisdictions on public spen-
ding in neighboring regions and estimate these functions for German communities.
They found signiﬁcant positive reactions for facilities encouraging business develop-
ment, for general administration and for supporting business enterprises.
Foucalt, Madi` es and Paty (2008) analyze interactions concerning different cate-
gories of local public spending among French municipalities. They found signiﬁcant
interdependence only for cities whose mayors share the same partisan afﬁliation. Er-
mini and Santolini (2007) test public spending interdependence among Italian jurisdic-
tions and found signiﬁcant interaction between their spending both at the level of total
expenditure and also for different sub-categories. Werck, Heyndels and Geys (2008)
found evidence that cultural expenditures in Flemish municipalities are positively af-
fected by the level of cultural spending of their neighbors. Redoano (2007) contributes
with an estimation of the spatial interdependence of ﬁscal policies, including both taxes
and expenditures, in European countries.
In this paper, we contribute to the empirical aspect of this literature. We aim to test
the existence of the spatial interdependence of local public expenditures using data on
205 Czech municipalities. We test the hypothesis that municipality councils in their
decisions on public expenditures take into account decisions of neighboring municipa-
lities. We focus mainly on expenditures on industry and infrastructure, culture, sports
and recreation, housing, utilities and regional development and expenditures on envi-
ronmental protection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses potential drivers of spatial
interdependence, Section 3 presents the data, Section 4 outlines the estimation tech-
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nique, discusses potential weighting matrices and gives estimation results, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical background
Fiscal interactions among local governments can be explained by various effects stem-
ming either from non-cooperative or cooperative behavior. The main sources of the
strategic interaction in the non-cooperative setup are spillovers, ﬁscal competition and
yardstick competition.1
The positive/negative spatial interdependence of local spending in games with non-
cooperative governments is equivalent to local spending being strategic complements/
strategic substitutes. The sign of interdependence is very sensitive to the institutional
environment, especially by the revenue-sharing of matching grant systems. In addition,
when supporting local businesses, the structure of local production matters.
(i) The ﬁrst and the foremost source is the presence of spillover effects. The beneﬁts
of public spending in domestic regions can easily spill over to neighboring regions
(Gordon 1983). This additional welfare effect inﬂuences local governments’ de-
cisions on its public spending in neighboring jurisdictions. We can observe either
a positive or negative correlation among neighbors’ public expenditures resulting
from its substitutability or complementarity, respectively.
The provision of cultural goods such as museums and cinemas, environmental pro-
tection or building new infrastructure in one region can increase the welfare of
residents in surrounding jurisdictions, because they can utilize these goods and
services. The optimal reaction of local government to this positive welfare effect
would be to free-ride on neighboring regions, decrease its expenditure on the par-
ticular policy and reallocate resources to different policies.
On the other hand, some policies pursued in one region can have negative con-
sequences in a neighboring region because they harm its residents and decrease
their utilities. For example, greater business support and subsequent development
of industry and infrastructure can deteriorate the environment in surrounding juris-
dictions. Consequently, they have to spend more on environmental protection.
(ii) The second source of the strategic interaction can be denoted as ﬁscal competition.
More attractive public goods in neighboring regions can decrease the inﬂow of
potential residents and potential businesses or can cause an outﬂow of current mo-
bile residents and mobile businesses operating in a domestic region, and therefore
decrease the welfare of its residents.
This idea stems from the hypothesis that individuals “vote with their feet” and
move to a community that provides the desired level of public goods, given the
underlying resource costs.
1 Revelli (2006b) speciﬁes channels of interaction in line with the above-mentioned sources such as prefe-
rences, constraints and expectations.
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A higher amount of residents and businesses in a region imply higher revenues
for its local government and more public goods. Moreover, businesses provide
job opportunities resulting in economic growth in problematic regions, increases
in purchasing power of population, and the elimination of negative consequences
related to high unemployment.
Thus, local governments have incentives to attract people to settle in their region
andencouragenewbusinessestooperatethere. Thiscanleadtocompetitionamong
local governments via speciﬁc types of spending resulting in spatial interdepen-
dence.
Keen and Marchand (1997) are among the ﬁrst authors who explore spending com-
petition. They state that under ﬁscal competition too much is spent on public goods
beneﬁting local business and too little on public goods beneﬁting residents, which
stems from labor immobility. Matsumoto (2000) and Borck (2005) further extend
this paper theoretically.
The fact that some municipalities in the Czech Republic care about their popula-
tion size is demonstrated in the special example of Jihlava, Hradec Kr´ alov´ e, Kol´ ın
and some other municipalities that have in the past actually paid people to reside
there (Koval´ ık 2006, Mackov´ a 2006). However, their behavior was driven by the
revenue-sharing system in which revenues per capita are bracketed by the popula-
tion level. For municipalities at the upper bound of the bracket, the incremental
beneﬁt of ending up in a higher bracket is enormous.
(iii) Local governments may also mimic decisions on the public goods provisions of
its neighbors. There are two main channels through which this behavior occurs.
Firstly, it is explained by yardstick competition: If incompletely informed voters
evaluate the performance of their government, they can take the policies pursued
by its neighbors as a yardstick (see Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995; Revelli
2006a), because they do not have information on the costs of running the ofﬁce or
public service provision.
This reasoning is further extended in Ashworth and Heyndels (2000) in the context
of taxation. They construct a speciﬁc behavioral hypothesis and argue that voters
receive extra rewards from superior policies or extra disutilityfrom inferior policies
if compared to policies in neighboring regions.
Secondly, it can be the local government that is incompletely informed. To avoid
information costs such as the costs of analyzing the demand of its residents or of
elaborating cost-beneﬁt analysis the local government can tend to mimic its own
neighbors.
(iv) Finally, we have to consider possible cooperation and coordination. On the con-
trary to the previous effects that are strategic and all arise from the non-cooperative
setup, this one stems from the cooperative game. Neighboring municipalities can
work on joint projects; they can jointly ﬁnance infrastructure, recreational services,
environmental protection or some common networks. Municipalities can also ex-
change ideas and experiences or learn each from other.
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In exceptional cases, municipalities can engage in the deeper process of coopera-
tion and even specialize. However, beneﬁts of specialized public good provisions
spread from one municipality to another through spillover channels. Although the
initial stimulus counts towards cooperation, as a consequence it is the existence of
spillovers that are the cause of spatial interdependence.
Cooperation among municipalities as a source of spatial interdependence is seldom
discussed in this literature. One of the few studies on this topic is by Petermann
Reifschneider (2006) who constructs models of cooperation between competing
jurisdictions.
Czech legislature serves as a good example in giving a legal basis for coopera-
tion among municipalities; municipalities can either cooperate in voluntary asso-
ciations, form partnerships, or their cooperation can be based on some contract
made to fulﬁll a special task. According to a survey carried by researchers from
the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences in the Czech Republic (see
Vajdov´ a et al. 2006), voluntary associations of municipalities are nearly always
formed by small municipalities whose own budgets are too tiny to carry forward
certain projects. These association are mostly focused on regional development,
tourism, environment, waste treatment, energy issues and infrastructure.
Alternative theoretical hypotheses of the potential effects driving spatial interde-
pendence summarized in Table 1 give rise to similar responses in the size of local
public expenditures. Therefore, it is very difﬁcult to attribute the observed behavior
to a unique theoretical model. In some cases, effects can even fade into one another.
Still, there exist some empirical strategies to identify the particular model as shown by
Revelli (2006b), but they require additional data.
Table 1. Sources of spatial interdependence
Cooperative Non-cooperative





Negative Specialization Positive spillover/externality
In this paper, we do not distinguish between various hypotheses driving the spatial
pattern, because we do not have the instruments and data for it. However, something
can be learned from this observed type of interdependence; for example, negative spa-
tial interdependence can be interpreted above all by the spillover hypothesis, because
specialization is very rare.
Some theoretical hypotheses can be also precluded for particular groups of ex-
penditures. For cultural expenditures we hardly see cooperation as suggested by the
survey mentioned above. Similarly, for expenditures on municipal services very nar-
rowly focused on the welfare of residents, the cooperation and spillover hypothesis is
at least probable. In addition, various models can operate on different spatial scales.
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Yardstick competition, spillovers and cooperation tend to take place in close neighbor-
hoods, however ﬁscal competition can occur also on a greater spatial scale.
3. Data
There were ﬁve tiers of government in the Czech Republic in the year 2006; the central
government, 14 regions (territorial self-governing districts, NUTS 3), 205 municipali-
ties with extended powers, 393 municipalities with an authorized municipal ofﬁce and
6,248 municipalities (basic territorial units, NUTS 5).2
A municipality with extended powers is at the same time a municipality with an
authorized municipal ofﬁce and a sole municipality. Various types of municipality ad-
ministration statutes differ in their powers and responsibilities. Municipalities with ex-
tended powers control territory with other municipalities and are responsible for social
transfers payments, social care, water industry, environment protection and infrastruc-
ture in the region.
In our analysis, we used cross-sectional data on municipalities with extended po-
wers in 2006. These municipalities represent small centers in their districts and all
the administrative agencies, banks, businesses, culture services are concentrated here.
Therefore, they are perfectly suitable for studying spatial interdependence.3
The Ministry of Finance provides the complete database of municipality budgets
(ARIS) providing a very detailed overview of municipality expenditures.4 We focus on
the overall expenditures and on four expenditure groups that are the most interesting
from our point of view: expenditures on housing, utilities and regional development,
industry and infrastructure, culture, sports and recreation and environmental protec-
tion. Housing, utilities and regional development spending includes expenditures on
the development of the housing economy, municipal utilities such as public lighting
and local services, town planning, territorial development and administration related
to these tasks; industry and infrastructure contains expenditures on industrial sup-
port, trade and services support, expenditures on roads, public transportation and on
telecommunications; the culture, sports and recreation group includes spending on on
cultural activities, sports events, sport clubs and recreational services; ﬁnally, environ-
mental protection expenditures include air protection, waste treatment, underground
water protection, soil protection and nature protection.
We analyze both capital and current expenditures for each group. Capital expendi-
tures represent investments to buildings and infrastructure which can create spillovers,
be instrument for ﬁscal competition, cause mimicking and municipalities can coope-
rate within them; therefore, they are the most suitable for our analysis. On the other
2 Until the end of 2002, the structure was different: instead of 14 regions there were 77 administrating
districts. Later, these districts existed only as territorial districts, NUTS 4, with no public administration
competencies. After the reform around 20% of the competencies were shifted from districts to the regions,
and 80% to municipalities with extended powers.
3 Other municipalities do have less competencies, along with a tiny and not-so-variable budget. For homo-
geneity, we exclude the capital city of Prague since its current expenditures per capita are two times higher
than the maximum from our sample.
4 http://www.mfcr.cz/cps/rde/xchg/mfcr/hs.xsl/aris.html
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hand, current expenditures mainly reﬂect how much of a public good is provided; they
represent the costs of operating public facilities. Still, there is a limitation of these ex-
penditures, as municipalities differ in cost efﬁciency or they can force different labor
costs. We expect to ﬁnd a stronger spatial interdependence effect for capital expendi-
tures than for current expenditures.5
In the model of the interaction of local public expenditures, we have to include the
various socio-economic and political characteristics of local jurisdictions. The eco-
nomic performance of a municipality can inﬂuence its expenditures. Unfortunately, we
do not have data on the GDP for this level of government, but we could approximate it
by the average gross wage. However, this control can bias results due to its correlation
with other demographical variables, such as the share of university-educated people,
therefore, it is not used.6 Budget constraint is important for spending, so we include
grants and subsidies per capita. We disregard tax revenues per capita as they are poten-
tially endogenous. Past liabilities can also inﬂuence decisions on public expenditures,
so we include the one year lagged indicator of debt service.7
We also have data on the ﬁnancial health of municipalities in 2005 in the form of
the ﬁnancial score computed by the Czech Credit Bureau, Inc.8 This indicator can be
potentially correlated with other economic variables, so we should use it with caution.
Additionally, jurisdictional demographic characteristics can affect public spending
becausetheyrepresenttheneedsandpreferencesofthepopulationforpublicgoodsand
services. The demand for public spending is determined by population structure and
education. So, we include a share of old people (above 65 years) and young people
(below 15 years), or a share of people in a productive age, depending on which one
works better, and a share of people above 15 years of age with a university education.9
Municipality size in terms of its population can also inﬂuence spending; larger mu-
nicipalities can spend more per capita because of providing more types of services. We
furthermore test the impact of the density of a population representing the measure of
the rate of urbanization. Denser municipalities can exploit economies of scale. Given
our data, it does not hold in the Czech Republic that large municipalities are denser,
therefore we include both variables in the estimation.
We also introduce political variables to control for characteristics of local govern-
ments ruling in 2006 (and which were elected in 2002). Generally, we would like
to know whether the ideology of a local government affects the level of its spending.
Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to recognize the political ideology of parties at
5 The analysis of current expenditures is useful especially in cases when there is a great variability of capital
expenditures among municipalities, and some do not spend anything.
6 In a previous version of the paper, wage was included in the estimation together with unemployment rate,
but they were nearly always insigniﬁcant.
7 The indicator of debt service is computed as ISP = r/t, where r is the sum of interest payments and
installments of stock and bonds, and t is the sum of tax revenues, non-tax revenues and subsidies from the
state budget.
8 The ﬁnancial score is part of the iRating constructed by CCB, Inc. for each municipality in the Czech
Republic. It includes 20 ﬁnancial indicators; each is evaluated on a scale from minus 25 to plus 25 in a
larger sample of all municipalities (not only those with extended powers). The total ﬁnancial score is the
weighted average of all indicators. To avoid negative numbers, we adjust the scale from 0 to 50.
9 The most recent data of this indicator was collected in the 2001 census.
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the municipal level except with the main political parties operating simultaneously at
the national level. Therefore, we construct dummy variable indicating that either the
Communist party or Social Democratic party, major Czech left-wing parties, was the
winner of municipality elections in 2002 and try to verify that left-wing governments
have greater incentives to spend more.
Furthermore, we also use party fragmentation. The number of parties and their
relativepowercanalsoinﬂuencedecisionsongovernmentspending, especiallyincases
of major investment decisions. We compute a Herﬁndahl index for party concentration
in the local council which is generally used as an indicator of party fragmentation
within the council.
And ﬁnally, due to spillovers from very large municipalities that can occur for
speciﬁc expenditures, we form dummy variable indicating municipalities that border
on large municipalities with more than 40,000 inhabitants. Variables and summary
statistics of expenditures and exogenous variables can be found in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total expenditures 22809 5415 14866 58053
Capital expenditures 6689 4020 1124 40337
Current expenditures 16121 3126 11248 33206
Housing, utilities and regional development 3447 2920 628 34096
Industry and infrastructure 3428 2219 395 15816
Culture, sports and recreation 2859 1542 457 9947
Environmental protection 1208 593 24 3684
Population 23261 38371 2892 366680
Population density (per km2) 143.80 174.30 32.00 1592.80
Share of youth 14.46 1.09 12.11 18.86
Share of people in a productive age 71.40 1.32 67.07 75.24
Share of elderly 14.14 1.51 9.69 17.44
Share of university-educated people 6.26 1.85 2.54 17.93
Subsidies per capita 1796.16 1821.42 162.00 15474.00
Debt service indicator 5.81 6.29 0.00 49.56
Financial score 17.47 5.09 6.78 30.77
Left-wing parties 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Party concentration 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.51
Source: Czech Statistical Ofﬁce (www.czso.cz); CCB, Inc.; Ministry of Finance.
Note: N = 205. Expenditures per capita (Czech koruna).
As we can see from Table 2, we can observe large differences in the capital ex-
penditures in municipalities. Some municipalities carry investment projects and some
do not. To smooth out the differences and to control for the fact that some municipa-
lities hold investments in one year and some in the following year, we use three-year
averages (2004-2006) for capital expenditures.
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4. Estimation
To test whether spending is spatially interdependent in Czech municipalities, we aim
to estimate a general reaction function (1). In the spatial lag model, the estimated
equation for the vector of spending z can be written as
z = bWz+qX +e, (1)
where the matrix X represents control variables, the matrix W deﬁnes the neighbor-
hood,10 e is a vector of errors, and b and vector q are parameters to be estimated.
There are two major issues arising from the estimation of this spatial lag model as
Brueckner (2003) states; endogeneity of the z’s and possible spatial error dependence.
Endogeneity in this context originates from the fact that for neighboring locations ij,
zj enters on the right hand side of the equation for zi, but zi also enters on the right hand
side of the equation for zj. To address the endogeneity problem, we should estimate
the model by one of the two main techniques used for spatial processes models:11
maximum likelihood estimation and instrumental variables estimation.
The second problem of estimating (1) can be the spatial error dependence arising
when e includes omitted variables that are spatially dependent. This effect can be
explained by unmodelled shocks that spill over across units of observation and thus
result in spatially correlated errors. In this case, the error vector e satisﬁes:
e = rVe +x, (2)
whereV is the weighting matrix that can be the same asW in (1), r is an autoregressive
parameter to be estimated and x is a random error term typically assumed to be i.i.d.12
This problem can be solved by using the estimation technique called generalized
spatial two-stage least squares procedure (GS2SLS) introduced in Kelejian and Prucha
(1998) that consists of three steps; (i) to compute 2SLS estimates in (1);13 (ii) to derive
residuals e from the ﬁrst step and estimate r in (2) by GMM as suggested by Kelejian
and Prucha (1999); (iii) to reestimate (1) by 2SLS after transforming the model via a
Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation to account for spatial error correlation.
In our analysis, we use various estimation techniques and compare results. Firstly,
we estimate the spatial lag model as is expressed in (1) by maximum likelihood and
test for spatial error autocorrelation. In the case it is present we reestimate the model
by GS2SLS. If even after that we do not get satisfying results, we estimate the spatial
error model in (2) by maximum likelihood.14
10 Note that weights for its own spending on the diagonal wii are always zero.
11 Recently, alternative estimation methods using maximum entropy have developed (LeSage and Pace
2004).
12 Kelejian and Prucha (2008) have recently developed a new technique for how to estimate r for heterosce-
dastic innovations x.
13 As is standard in spatial econometrics literature, we instrument z by X and WX (e.g. Heyndels and
Vuchelen, 1998; Soll` e-Oll` e, 2005; Geys, 2006; Werck, Heyndels and Geys, 2008). The Sargan test of the
overidentifying restrictions suggests that our instruments are valid for cases when we get signiﬁcant effects
of control variables.
14 For maximum likelihood estimation of the spatial lag model, we assume that errors are i.i.d., and of the
spatial error model we assume that there is no spatial lag dependence, z = qX +e. ML estimation brings
more accurate results than its IV counterpart (Das et al. 2003).
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4.1 Neighborhood matrix
The crucial point of study is the construction of a neighborhood weighting matrix. This
is fundamental when dealing with spatial correlation since it introduces the potential
spatial correlation among units of observations. In our study we consider various ma-
trices. For each matrix, we test for spatial autocorrelation which can be measured by
Moran’s I statistics (Moran 1948).
All weighting matrices are based on geographical speciﬁcation. The simplest ma-
trix that can be used is the ﬁrst-order neighborhood matrix. It positively weights only
those municipalities, with which it shares a common border. Borders are not borders
of the municipality itself, but of a district which is controlled by the municipality with
extended powers.
Additionally, we can construct the neighborhood matrix based on distance bands.
For this purpose, we collect spatial coordinates for each municipality and study spatial
autocorrelation for different distance bands. Only municipalities lying within a given
distance band are weighted positively.
Finally, in our neighborhood matrix we want to express the fact that municipalities
can weight decisions on expenditures of similar municipalities more. This matrix is
based on the geographical neighborhood deﬁned by the distance band, but the weights
are not the same for all neighbors.15
Table 3. Moran’s I test for various neighborhood matrices
W W20 W25 W30 W35 WS20 WS25 WS30 W35
Current expenditures
II 0.010 0.010 0.001 −0.026 −0.001 0.060 0.044 0.019 0.033
CS 0.028 0.086∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
HD 0.086∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.050 0.022 0.016 0.118∗∗ 0.056∗ 0.026 0.019
EP −0.017 0.084∗ 0.020 0.000 0.022 0.089∗∗ 0.023 0.001 0.024
ALL 0.091∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗
Capital expenditures
II 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
CS 0.133∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
HD 0.041∗ 0.030 0.054∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.036 0.061∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
EP −0.015 −0.023 −0.032 −0.015 −0.016 −0.017 −0.029 −0.015 −0.017
ALL 0.147∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
ALL 0.038 0.153∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. W is the ﬁrst-order neighborhood
matrix; W20, W25, W30 and W35 are matrices based on a given distance band in kilometers; WS20,
WS25, WS30 and WS35 denote matrices based on similar characteristics and given distance band. All
are nonstandardized. Expenditures groups are denoted as follows: industry and infrastructure (II), culture,
sports and recreation (CS), housing, utilities and regional development (HD) and environmental protection
(EP). (ALL) means the total expenditures of given type.
15 We characterize municipalities by K variables: population size, population density, share of young and
old people, share of university-educated people, average gross wage and unemployment rate. Each variable
xk, k ∈ K is normalized from 0 to 1. The weight of the municipality lying within the distance band is given
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Table 3 presents the results of the spatial autocorrelation test Moran’s I for vari-
ous expenditure groups using the various matrices suggested above. We use distance
bands from 20 to 35 kilometers, which are the most reasonable.16 Signiﬁcant results
indicate that municipalities’ expenditures cluster in space and we should be suspicious
of spatial interdependence. If we compare various types of matrices, we can see that
those that take into account the differences of municipalities’ characteristics perform
the best foralmostall expenditures groups. The resultsalso suggest that relevant neigh-
borhood size is different for various expenditures groups and verify that the distinction
among current and capital expenditures is important due to the observed diverse spatial
autocorrelation pattern.
4.2 Estimation results
In this section, we aim to estimate whether local public expenditures in Czech munici-
palities are spatially interdependent. We mainly focus on capital expenditures as there
is a higher potential of interaction. However, the results in Table 3 illustrate the dif-
ferent spatial patterns in scale for current and capital expenditures on housing, utilities
and regional development, therefore we also analyze its current spending. Concern-
ing expenditures on environmental protection, the data on capital expenditures is very
weak, because almost 28% of municipalities do not spend anything. Thus, in this case,
we study the current and capital expenditures together.
We work with three neighbourhood matrices, WS20, WS25 and WS30, for which
we observed highest spatial autocorrelation. We ﬁrstly estimate the model by the ma-
ximum likelihood spatial lag model and construct Moran’s I to test for spatial error
autocorrelation. In the case that spatial error autocorrelation is signiﬁcant, we reesti-
mate the model by GS2SLS.
Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimation: spatial lag model
WS20 WS25 WS30
b error b error b error
Current expenditures
HD 0.077∗∗∗ 0.055 0.036∗ 0.058∗ 0.010 0.051∗
Capital expenditures
II 0.008 0.181∗∗∗ 0.030 0.179∗∗∗ 0.012 0.151∗∗∗
CS 0.047∗∗ 0.048 0.046∗∗ 0.049 0.046∗∗∗ 0.051∗
HD −0.032 0.112∗∗ 0.014 0.071∗∗ 0.026 0.049∗
ALL −0.009 0.153∗∗∗ 0.016 0.118∗∗∗ 0.007 0.096∗∗∗
EP −0.012 0.140∗∗∗ −0.002 0.115∗∗∗ −0.010 0.136∗∗∗
ALL 0.000 0.091∗∗ 0.002 0.077∗∗ 0.001 0.066∗∗
Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Table 4 presents partial results out of maximum likelihood estimation. Parameter b
16 For a distance band of 15 kilometers there are 72 municipalities having no neighbors; for 40 kilometers,
the average number of neighbors is greater than 11.
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expresses the spatial interdependence effect and the error columns show Moran’s I test
for spatial error autocorrelation. The complete results are available in the Appendix.
The results are in line with the previous Table 3. In cases of strong spatial auto-
correlation, we observe high b. Nevertheless, it is mostly insigniﬁcant. In the follo-
wing analysis, we disregard neighborhoods that are less relevant for each expenditure
groups. Except for current expenditures on housing, utilities and regional development
and capital expenditures on culture, sports and recreation, we have to reestimate all the
models by GS2SLS, as we detected a spatial error autocorrelation.
Even if GS2SLS does not help and we might not reject the hypothesis of the zero
spatial lag dependence, we use the maximum likelihood error model. In the case of
overall expenditures, we do not detect any spatial process, thus we use the simple OLS
regression. Table 5 shows the ﬁnal results.17
Table 5. Estimation results
Current Capital Total
HD II CS HD ALL EP ALL
Neighborhood WS20 WS25 WS20 WS30 WS25 WS20 WS25
Model ML lag G2SLS ML lag G2SLS ML error G2SLS OLS
b 0.077∗∗∗−0.085∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ −0.041∗
r 0.370∗ −0.046∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.058∗
Population 0.001 0.002 0.050∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.013∗∗ −0.001 0.023∗
Population density −0.329 −0.204 0.139 −0.869 −0.974∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗−2.826∗∗∗
Young people −86.82 −7.376 214.2∗∗ −300.5∗∗ −64.73 −633.5∗
People in prod. age 53.27∗
Old people −69.40 71.31 108.1∗ −50.01 210.2∗∗ −141.0
University education −16.62 183.6∗∗∗−19.07 −102.2 213.8∗ 85.91∗∗∗ 256.9
Subsidies 0.167∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.045 0.720∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗−0.010 1.462∗∗∗
Debt service 6.044 6.561 −10.23 14.51 38.59∗
Financial score 41.18∗∗ 3.096
Left-wing parties 234.8 −319.9∗ 298.6∗ −123.5 55.97 50.42 −668.4
Party concentration 5615∗∗∗ 1494 −735.5 5971∗∗∗ 5336∗ 401.7 5517
Large city in neigh. −219.3∗ −106.8
Altitude −1.081∗∗
Large city dummy 386.8∗∗
Constant 1222 −211.5 −3925 4255∗ 132.6 −2537 27949∗∗∗
R2 0.38
Log likelihood −1593.19 −1554.04 −1843.37
Sargan test 8.402 10.635 9.284
Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Spatial lag dependence was found for all expenditures groups except for overall
17 Controls have been chosen according to a large sensitivity analysis carried out. Detailed results are
available upon request. For environmental expenditures we add two more special variables, such as altitude
and a dummy for large cities having more than 40,000 inhabitants.
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capital expenditures, for which at least spatial error dependence was detected. Firstly,
we look at the sign of interdependence.
Negative spatial interdependence
For expenditures on environmental protection and expenditures on industry and infras-
tructure, we obtained the negative coefﬁcient of spatial lag. This ﬁnding supports the
spillover hypothesis. The beneﬁts of public goods provided in neighboring municipa-
lities spill over to the domestic municipality, which can thus reallocate resources to
different local policies.
Air and water pollution are classic examples of negative externalities in economic
literature. It is costly to eliminate pollution originating from a neighboring municipa-
lity and the lower the pollution externality is, the less a municipality has to spend on
its elimination. Higher expenditures on environmental protection in neighboring mu-
nicipalities imply lower domestic spending, and therefore, expenditures are negatively
spatially interdependent.
Surprisingly, the spillover hypothesis was also assigned to capital expenditures on
industry and infrastructure. Public infrastructure represents mainly networks, such as
roads, telecommunications or railways, so it is expected that the higher stock of capital
in one jurisdiction will increase the production in other jurisdictions. The domestic
workforce can also beneﬁt from ﬁrms producing in neighboring regions due to com-
muting. These spillovers seem to outweigh the potential competition effect, when
neighboring regions behave as rivals and compete among each other for ﬁrms through
these expenditures. Or different competition channels can exist that are not included
in these expenditures. Some regions can have a more high-skilled labor force, special
government investment incentives for ﬁrms, or property tax matters can also exist.18
Positive spatial interdependence
Positive spatial interdependence was discovered for current and capital expenditures
on housing, utilities and regional development, and for capital expenditures on culture,
sports and recreation. Concerning the latter, this spending can have large spillovers as
there may be a high degree of substitutability of leisure activities across municipalities.
People can be almost indifferent as to whether to consume these goods in domestic
or other municipalities. Spillovers then give rise to free-riding and negative spatial
interdependence.
In our case, the results suggest opposite and different effects, mimicking or com-
petition, matter.19 Municipalities hardly aim at attracting new residents via the support
of cultural and sport life. More likely, they mimic each other. Due to strong spillovers,
information on cultural and sports events spreads easily to neighboring regions, and
the absence of any leisure activities in the domestic municipality appears worse when
neighboring municipalities provide these services and goods. Thus, higher expendi-
tures on leisure activities in neighboring municipalities can put pressure on the domes-
tic government to increase these expenditures.
Another expenditures group of interest is housing, utilities and regional develop-
ment spending. Capital spending is mostly related to housing construction. In large
18 Property tax is the only tax that can be partly set by municipalities, but the differences are not large.
19 According to the survey mentioned in the theoretical section, cooperation is hardly probable.
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neighborhoods, this spending has proven to be spatially interdependent. The main aim
of housing construction support is to attract new people to settle in the region. There-
fore, the positive spatial interdependency can be attributed to the ﬁscal competition
hypothesis.
Positive interdependence in current expenditures referring to the size of pure mu-
nicipal services cannot be explained by cooperation, as they are narrowly targeted to
the welfare of residents. These expenditures probably do not even inﬂuence people’s
decisions as to whether to reside in the region or not, so a ﬁscal competition hypothesis
can be precluded. Finally, we are left with the last possible effect of mimicking.
Spatial error dependence
For some groups we also ﬁnd signiﬁcant spatial error dependence. This effect shows
that municipalities face some external shock. Another source of this dependence may
come from omitted variables that are related through space.
Speciﬁc policies such as business development or other investments can be sup-
ported by particular regional governments controlling territory with more municipa-
lities with extended powers. There can also exist state regulation targeting speciﬁc
regions, such as the “Natura 2000” ensuring protection of birds. Or weather conditions
matter, such as ﬂoods affecting municipalities lying within large region that are forced
to build new infrastructure.
Let us brieﬂy discuss the effects of some control variables. Larger municipalities
in terms of its population tend to spend more on culture, sports and recreation, housing
construction and on overall capital expenditures. This conﬁrms the fact that cultural
life concentrates in larger cities that are, at the same time, more capable of carrying
out investment projects, such as housing construction. Population density negatively
affects overall capital spending, which veriﬁes the existence of economies to scale. If
the municipality provides some capital goods, then the marginal costs of additional
users are close to zero. This effect is also observed for environmental expenditures.
Results prove that for some expenditures groups population structure is important.
The share of young and old people, for example, positively inﬂuences spending on
leisure goods. Children’s leisure time should be utilized. Another population demo-
graphic who enjoy cultural events in their domestic municipality are elderly people;
they are more interested in cultural spending because they have a lower opportunity
cost of time. The share of people in a productive age positively affects environmen-
tal spending. The share of university educated people also does. These people care
more about environmental protection, therefore they can be either those who decide
upon environmental policy in local government or those who vote for politicians with
a higher preference for good environment. Education is also a signiﬁcant determinant
for overall capital spending and spending on industry and infrastructure. People with
a university education could have similar interests as entrepreneurs, or even run their
own business.
Concerning budget constraint, municipalities mainly do not react on past deﬁcit,
but on current budget constraints, given by subsidies in our case. The ﬁnancial score
was found to be useful only in the case of current expenditures on municipal services,
the greater the ﬁnancial health of a municipality, the more money is spent on this task.
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We can observe interesting effects for political variables. We ﬁnd evidence that
left-wing parties tend to decrease expenditures on industry and infrastructure and at
the same time increase expenditures on culture, sports and recreation. Party concen-
tration also matters. If parties in the municipality council are more concentrated, then
spending on housing, utilities and regional development and on overall capital expen-
ditures are higher. More parties in the local council more likely disagree on huge
investments projects requiring a lot of political and ﬁnancial support. This hypothesis
is supported by Alesina and Drazen (1991) in their analysis of how political struggles
delay reforms, or by the war of attrition model in Alesina et al. (2006).
Additionally, a large city in a neighborhood negatively affects the municipality’s
cultural spending. The municipality tends to free ride on the large city, which has an
advantage in providing cultural goods.
Environmental expenditures speciﬁc controls were found to be signiﬁcant. Large
cities are centers of business life, which produce higher emissions, so they have to
spend more. Results also suggest that municipalities situated at a higher altitude spend
less on environmental protection, probably due to a better natural environment.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we sought evidence of the spatial interdependence of local public ex-
penditures in the Czech Republic. We tested the hypothesis that in their decisions on
public spending, municipality councils take into account the decisions of neighboring
municipalities. Interaction among municipalities can stem from (i) spillover effects,
when residents beneﬁt or are harmed from the public good provided in a neighboring
region; (ii) competition, when municipalities aim to attract residents and businesses
to their region; (iii) mimicking, driven by yardstick competition or by the incomplete
information of councils about costs or the demand for public goods; (iv) and due to
cooperation, because neighboring municipalities can work on joint projects.
Inouranalysis, wefocusedonoverallexpendituresandvariousexpendituregroups;
industry and infrastructure, culture, sports and recreation, housing, utilities and re-
gional development, and environmental protection.
By using various tests we found the neighborhood matrix that was relevant for
a particular expenditure type. The matrices were based on distance band from 20
to 30 kilometers and took into account differences in municipalities’ characteristics.
Technically, we estimated the municipality’s reaction function and used two different
techniques: maximum likelihood and generalized spatial two-stage least squares. If
the spatial error and lag dependence occurred at the same time, the latter one was more
appropriate.
We found positive spatial interdependence in capital expenditures on culture, sports
and recreation and current and capital expenditures on housing, utilities and regional
development. We argued that municipalities mimic each other in cultural expenditures,
as well as in current expenditures on municipal services. Additionally, ﬁscal competi-
tion occurred in capital expenditures on housing construction.
Negative spatial interdependence was observed for environmental expenditures and
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for capital expenditures on industry and infrastructure. This effect veriﬁes the spillover
hypothesis that the beneﬁts of public goods provided in neighboring municipalities
spill over to the domestic municipality. This was surprising for the latter expenditure
group, as it did not verify the expected hypothesis of ﬁscal competition.
The results also bring interesting effects of political variables. We found weak
evidence that party fragmentation decreased capital expenditures, so the higher the
disagreement among parties in municipality councils, the lower the amount of spen-
ding on investment projects. Similarly, party fragmentation decreased expenditures on
housing. Left-wing parties tended to spend more on culture, sports and recreation, an
area from which mainly residents (and not businesses) beneﬁted. Left-wing voters may
also demand these public goods and services more than right-wing voters. On the other
hand, these parties seemed to spend less on industry and infrastructure.
Although we aimed to assign theoretical models to observed effects of spatial inter-
dependence, we could not always be sure which model it was driven by. In some cases,
various theoretical models could also work simultaneously. In our future research, we
will aim to ﬁnd instruments for how to distinguish these models.
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